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TRAPPED IN THE GODDESS’S MOUSETRAP:
EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS FOR POVERTY
POACHING OF VENUS FLYTRAPS
Katrina Outland1
Abstract
Most discussions of poaching—the intentional, unlawful taking or killing of a
living organism—focus on animals. However, poaching is also the primary threat
for many prized collectible plants. The bizarre Venus flytrap has particularly
drawn media attention as North Carolina struggles to save its endemic State
Carnivorous Plant from extinction. Existing federal plant protection laws are
sparse and either ineffective (in the case of the Endangered Species Act) or
underutilized (in the case of the Lacey Act). Traditional poaching enforcement
methods, which target individual poachers with small fines, are designed for
animal poaching, and fail to adequately protect plants. Not only do enforcement
officers have difficulty finding plant poachers, but poverty, drug use, and
cultural traditions often provide incentives that small fines do little to deter.
North Carolina has taken one alternative approach by increasing deterrence
through stricter penalties, including jail time. Another alternative approach is
using the Lacey Act to enforce state laws, as modeled by a maple-poaching case
in Washington State. This comment argues that a combination of these two
approaches may best protect the Venus flytrap—and avoid the inequities of
traditional enforcement—by targeting upstream buyers and resellers of poached
plants with more severe penalties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The crimson jaws—a tiny bloodstain against green
shadows—gape patient, still, with trigger hairs waiting. An
insect lands, explores the curious color, brushes against one
hair, then two, signaling fearsome interlocking “teeth” to snap
shut around it.2 The swift ambush of the carnivorous Venus
flytrap (Dionae muscipula)3 has long captured the wonder and
horror of both science and fiction.4 Yet, this ferocious-looking
plant is itself the delicate victim of its own predator, who
crawls patiently through bogs with spoon and trowel in hand:
the poacher.5
2. Ed Yong, Venus Flytraps Are Even Creepier Than We Thought, THE ATLANTIC
(Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/01/the-venus-fly-trapcounts-the-struggles-of-its-prey/424782/ [https://perma.cc/48GV-LGE7].
3. The Latin name translates literally as Diana’s (the mother of Venus)’s mousetrap.
See
LATIN
DICTIONARY,
https://www.online-latin-dictionary.com/
[https://perma.cc/RL72-Y7ZQ] (search each word individually) (last visited Apr. 28,
2018).
4. See, e.g., CHARLES DARWIN, INSECTIVOROUS PLANTS 286 (1899) (describing the
Venus flytrap as “one of the most wonderful in the world”); THE LITTLE SHOP OF
HORRORS (Filmgroup 1960) (imagining a huge, human-eating version of the flytrap).
5. Historically, “poaching” has not extended to plants. See, e.g., Poaching, BLACK’S
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The Venus flytrap—the only species of flytrap in the world,
native only to a small section of North and South Carolina6—
has captured recent media attention as the swiftly
disappearing victim of poverty-driven poachers looking for
quick cash in a collection-driven market.7 Its plight has
spurred North Carolina to increase the penalty of taking wild
Venus flytraps from a misdemeanor to a felony.8 In 2016,
nationwide plant specialists petitioned for its listing under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), which is still pending review.9
Though these actions are too recent to tell how effectively they
may prevent Venus flytrap poaching, other plants under
similar poaching threats, like maple trees and ginseng, provide
some useful comparators.
The legal landscape around poaching focuses on animals,
largely ignoring the havoc that poaching wreaks on prized
collector plants, including carnivorous plants. Part I of this
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (using a 17th century definition of the term: “The
illegal taking or killing of fish or game on another’s land.”). Now, plants may be
included as protected “species,” such as in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). See
Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 3(16), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2012). However, the
modern legal term “taking/take” often has a much broader meaning that encapsulates
even unintentional harm, including “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” Id. § 3(19). This
comment adopts a middle ground of common usage, defining plant poaching as the
intentional killing or taking—including collecting—of plants in knowing violation of
any law.
6. James Affolter et al., Petition to List the Venus Flytrap (Dionaea muscipula Ellis)
as Endangered Under the 1973 Endangered Species Act 7 (Oct. 21, 2016),
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/table/petitions-received.html
[https://perma.cc/F2V23GXP].
7. See, e.g., Phoebe Judge, Dropping Like Flies, CRIMINAL (Apr. 24, 2014)
http://thisiscriminal.com/episode-five-dropping-like-flies-4-24-2014/
[https://perma.cc/SH6G-H8FL]; Elizabeth Shockman, The Little-Known World of
Endangered Plant Poaching, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Nov. 30, 2015, 8:45 AM),
http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-11-30/little-known-world-endangered-plant-poaching
[https://perma.cc/2ZC8-5KP8].
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-129.3 (2014).
9. Affolter et al., supra note 6. As of the publication of this comment, this petition
has survived the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (USFWS) “90-day finding” (which
took fourteen months) that it “present[s] substantial scientific or commercial
information indicating” that the flytrap may warrant listing. Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 90-Day Findings for Five Species, 82 Fed. Reg.
60,362, 60,366 (Dec. 20, 2017). The USFWS is currently undergoing its required 12month review of whether listing the species is warranted. Id. Updates available at:
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/profile/speciesProfile?sId=7142
[https://perma.cc/8VSDGL7H].
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paper describes why plant poaching needs more attention and
demonstrates the sparsity of United States federal law on the
issue, using the Venus flytrap as a focal point.
Part II focuses on the human element of plant poaching and
the motives behind it. First, this comment coins and defines
“poverty poaching” as the intentional taking or killing of a wild
plant or animal done for the primary purpose of making
needed income—regardless of other possible motives—but not
including organized crime. Second, Part II defines traditional
enforcement methods as catching individual poachers in the
act and assessing small fines and explores why these methods
fail both plants and people.
Other plant poaching cases provide examples of alternative
methods to traditional enforcement in Part III. First, North
Carolina has started using harsher penalties—including jail
time—for some of the more egregious ginseng and flytrap
poachers. Second, federal prosecutors in Washington State
utilized provisions of the Lacey Act to enforce state law against
a mill owner who knowingly bought poached lumber.10
Part IV draws these examples together, explores their
relative strengths and weaknesses, and argues that using a
combination of both stricter penalties and the Lacey Act to
incorporate state laws against high-profile upstream resellers
provides a more equitable approach to protecting the Venus
flytrap and other threatened plants.
II. POACHING IS AN OFTEN IGNORED BUT SERIOUS
THREAT TO COLLECTIBLE PLANTS
Despite the public focus on celebrity animal species such as
elephants, many species of plants are also threatened by mass
poaching.11 Plants that are particularly vulnerable are those
highly prized by collecting communities, like rare orchids12 or
10. Indictment at 7, United States v. J & L Tonewoods, No. 3:15-cr-05350 (W.D.
Wash. July 23, 2015) [hereinafter J & L Tonewoods Indictment].
11. E.g., Natasha Gilbert, Habitat Loss Is the Biggest Hazard to Plant Biodiversity,
NATURE
(Sept.
28,
2010),
http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100928/full/
news.2010.499.html [https://perma.cc/T5QZ-4WQ9] (pointing out that although 20% of
plant species are at risk of extinction—putting them under greater threat than birds—
the first global risk assessment was not conducted until 2010).
12. See ROYAL BOTANIC GARDENS KEW, STATE OF THE WORLD’S PLANTS 2017, at 83
(2017), https://stateoftheworldsplants.com/2017/report/SOTWP_2017.pdf (noting the
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lichens.13 Within the plant kingdom, carnivorous plants are
some of the most targeted oddities, and among them the truly
unique Venus flytrap is one of the most threatened by
poaching. Yet, the United States’ legal system has been slow to
recognize plant poaching at all. The two main comprehensive
statutes that furnish plant poaching protections are the ESA
and the Lacey Act. The ESA—a success for many animals—is
largely ineffective for plants. The Lacey Act, while slow to
encompass plants, now offers stronger legal protections,
though such protections are underutilized.
A. Poaching is a Major Threat to Carnivorous Plants
Carnivorous plants are fascinating exemplars of
evolutionary adaptation to unyielding environments. They can
thrive in areas of nutrient-starved soils where few other plants
can survive, but also can be overwhelmed by other plants that
outcompete them for light.14 They have evolved into seventeen
genera (categories of similar species), all of which capture
insects or other animals to make up for a lack of soil nutrients
using two general methods: snap traps and passive snares, like
sticky traps.15 The waterwheel (Aldrovanda vesiculosa) and
the Venus flytrap (Dionaea muscipula) are the only two species
that evolved snap traps. 16 Each is a monotypic genus—
International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s Red List assesses orchids as
“Vulnerable” because they are highly collected); see also SUSAN ORLEAN, THE ORCHID
THIEF (Ballantine Books 13th ed. 2000) (1998) (narrating the eccentric underworld of
illegal orchid collecting).
13. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination that
Designation of Critical Habitat Is Not Prudent for the Rock Gnome Lichen, 66 Fed.
Reg. 51,445, 51,447 (Oct. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Rock Gnome Lichen Determination]
(detailing the devastation of rampant collecting on this endangered species, including
the account of Dr. Paula DePriest who “observed that the type locality for rock gnome
lichen was virtually wiped out by lichenologists who collected them during a field trip,
in spite of the fact that this collection occurred within a national park and was not
permitted.”).
14. David E. Jennings & Jason R. Rohr, A Review of the Conservation Threats to
Carnivorous Plants, 144 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1356, 1357 (2011).
15. Id.; Simon Poppinga et al., Trap Diversity and Evolution in the Family
Droseraceae, 8 PLANT SIGNALING & BEHAV. 1, 1 (2013).
16. Poppinga et al., supra note 15,15 at 1. “Snap trap” refers to the mechanism by
which the Venus flytrap rapidly ‘snaps’ closed by electrical signals triggered when
insects touch small hairs that line the flytrap’s crimson “mouth.” Affolter et al., supra
note 6, at 9; Yong, supra note 2.
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meaning each represents the only existing species in the world
like itself, the waterwheel being the only underwater snap
trap, and the flytrap being the only terrestrial snap trap. 17
Wild Venus flytraps grow in only one spot on the globe: the
coastal plains of southeast North Carolina and a small patch in
northeast South Carolina.18
The peculiarity of carnivorous plants is not their only value.
Some pitcher plants may host entire communities of animals
that exist nowhere else, including tiny frogs floating in their
sticky, semi-transparent bulbs.19 Carnivorous plants, as a
whole, also eat biting and stinging insects and their eggs,
reducing populations of mosquitos, horseflies, and other pests
that spread human diseases. 20
Carnivorous plants experience threats differently from other
plants. While carnivorous plants share many of the most
common threats to plants globally—including habitat loss,
climate change, and invasive species 21—poaching looms as a
much bigger threat to carnivorous plants. 22 Of the 102
carnivorous plant species evaluated by the International Union
for the Conservation of Nature, fifty-six percent are considered
threatened.23 “Overcollecting” (including legal and illegal
methods) is the second most common threat to carnivorous
plants overall, and is the biggest threat to pitcher plants.24
Overcollecting is a “particularly common threat” for the Venus

17. Poppinga et al., supra note 15, at 1; Genus, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/science/genus-taxon [https://perma.cc/X5FJ-DB8L] (last
updated Apr. 20, 2017).
18. Affolter, supra note 6, at 7, 11.
19. Jennings & Rohr, supra note 14, at 1357.
20. Id.
21. Compare ROYAL BOTANIC GARDENS KEW, supra note 12, at 42–71 (discussing
that the most pressing global threats to plants are climate change, wildfires, invasive
species, and pests) with Jennings & Rohr, supra note 14, at 1358–59 (identifying
common threats to carnivorous plants including habitat loss from agriculture,
aquaculture, harvesting, collecting, invasive species, pollution, and habitat
modification including fires).
22. Jennings & Rohr, supra note 14, at 1359 (“[O]ver-collection in particular seems
to be a much greater threat to carnivorous plants when compared with most other
taxa.”).
23. Id. at 1357.
24. Id. at 1359 (noting that pitcher plant species “were predominantly affected by
over-collection”).
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flytrap as well.25
The Venus flytrap is relatively easy to grow, and most
commercially sold plants come from legitimate growers.26
However, its popularity still proves tantalizing for poachers of
wild flytraps, who can steal and sell hundreds or thousands of
plants at a time for about $0.25 each. 27
B. Existing Plant Protection Laws Are Piecemeal and
Underutilized
The law has been slow to seriously recognize poaching
threats to plants, as demonstrated by their weaker protections
compared to animals in the Lacey Act and the ESA. Some
relatively recent additions to these two laws have improved
plant protections, at least on paper. However, some plants that
are highly prized by collectors continue to suffer devastating
losses that these laws have done little to prevent—so far.
1. The Endangered Species Act Operates Ineffectively in
Protecting Plants
The ESA, while historically providing strict protections for
listed animal species,28 does not extend the same level of
protection to plants.29 First, the ESA prohibits takings of
endangered or threatened “fish or wildlife” (encompassing all
animal species)30 from any area in the United States,31
including private land,32 but plant takings are only prohibited

25. Id.
26. Affolter et al., supra note 6, at 7, 9 (noting that commercial propagation is so
common that “[m]ore plants exist in captivity now than exist in the wild”).
27. See Sarah Zielinski, Back Away from the Carnivorous Plant!, SMITHSONIAN (Apr.
11,
2011),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/back-away-from-thecarnivorous-plant-176740710/ [https://perma.cc/EX7J-PHKL] (“[C]ustoms agents at
Baltimore-Washington International Airport once intercepted a suitcase containing
9,000 poached flytraps bound for the Netherlands . . . .”).
28. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978) (“Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.”)
29. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law
Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 830–31 (1986).
30. Endangered Species Act § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(8) (2012).
31. See id. § 9(a)(1).
32. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 497 (4th Cir. 2000).
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on federal land.33 Second, prohibited taking of animals
includes unintentional acts like habitat modification, 34 but
taking of plants requires either retaining possession or
knowingly violating a state law, thereby excluding acts like
vandalism.35 Third, enforcement of protections for listed plants
may also be inadequate. For example, in 2011, biologists at the
University of Notre Dame found “around ten percent” of ESAlisted plant species illegally available for sale online.36
At a basic level, the structure of the ESA may not be wellsuited to protecting plants: the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS) has declined to extend critical habitat protections to
almost all listed plant species, largely because the very act of
publicly declaring the species’ habitats puts them at even more
risk of being collected.37 Some conservationists even take
matters into their own hands, physically transplanting listed
plants outside their natural ranges, which can unfortunately
spread diseases and invasive species. 38 Finally, and notably
true in the Venus flytrap’s case thus far, the ESA does not help
rare plants until they are in imminent danger of extinction.39

33. Endangered Species Act, § 9(a)(2); see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.61(c)(1) (2017)
(prohibited plant takings added in 1982); see also Kevin E. Regan, The Need for a
Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Rare Plants: Florida as a Case Study, 44 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 125, 140–41 (2004).
34. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2017).
35. Regan, supra note 33, at 141.
36. Nell Greenfieldboyce, A Growing Risk? Endangered Plants for Sale Online, NPR
(Feb. 7, 2011 12:10 PM), https://www.npr.org/2011/02/07/133565494/a-growing-riskendangered-plants-for-sale-online [https://perma.cc/2T8E-6JU7].
37. Conservation Council for Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1280–81 (D. Haw.
1998) (“Since the enactment of the ESA, the [USFWS] has listed approximately 700
plants nationwide as endangered or threatened. Of those 700 plants, the [USFWS] has
designated a critical habitat for twenty-four.”); see also Rock Gnome Lichen
Determination, supra note 13, at 51,448 (finding that “attracting moss collectors to
watersheds designated as sanctuaries and occupied by the endangered lichen could
result in devastating incidental collection of the listed species”).
38. See Greenfieldboyce, supra note 36; Amina Khan, Carnivorous Plants Losing
Ground in the U.S., L.A. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2010) http://articles.latimes.com/print/
2010/sep/07/science/la-sci-carni-plants-20100908 [https://perma.cc/XZ8B-97DB].
39. Regan, supra note 33, at 137 (contrasting how the broader body of wildlife law
“considers the overall health of species populations” to sustainably manage game
resources with the fact that most plant protections are relegated to the ESA and other
laws that “fail to protect a plant species before its population has declined to the point
of being threatened or endangered”).
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2. The Lacey Act’s Plant Protections Are Relatively Recent
and Underutilized
The Lacey Act, created in 1900 to federalize state poaching
crimes, was originally restricted to narrow categories of
animals that did not even include fish. 40 Throughout the next
century, the Lacey Act’s definitions expanded to include most
types of fish and wildlife, and expanded federal reach over
importing animals in violation of foreign law as well. 41 Plants,
however, were excluded from most of the Lacey Act’s
protections, and as of 1982, the definition of “plant” was
narrowly limited to “any wild member of the plant kingdom,
including roots, seeds, and other parts thereof (but excluding
common food crops and cultivars).”42 Up until 2008, the Lacey
Act only prohibited violations of federal, tribal, and state plant
laws.43
In 2008, Congress amended the Lacey Act to significantly
expand protections of plants as part of the Food, Conservation,
and Energy Act of 2008. 44 Congress expressed two reasons for
expanding plant protections: to protect the ecosystem, and to
bolster the U.S. timber industry by preventing unfair
competition from illegal forestry.45 The 2008 amendments

40. Trevor Krost, Note, The World’s Laws in American Justice: The Foreign Law
Provisions of the 2008 Lacey Act Amendments, 8 PITT. J. ENVTL. PUB . HEALTH L. 55, 58
(2013).
41. Id. at 58–59.
42. Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371(f) (1982). Though neither “common food crops” nor
“cultivars” are defined in the Lacey Act, the U.S. Department of Agriculture defined
them in regulation after the 2008 amendments. See Lacey Act Implementation Plan;
Definitions for Exempt and Regulated Articles, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,940, 40,940 (interim
final rule July 9, 2013) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 357).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(3)(B) (prohibiting “any person to import,
export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase” a plant “taken or possessed in
violation of any law, treaty, or regulation of the United States or in violation of any
Indian tribal law,” or “taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law or
regulation of any State,” and prohibiting the possession within a maritime or
territorial U.S. jurisdiction of “any plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in
violation of any law or regulation of any State”); see also Krost, supra note 40, at 59.
44. Pub. L. No 110-234 § 8204, 122 Stat. 1291 (2008). The Food, Conservation, and
Energy Act of 2008 spanned a vast array of new and amended statutes; the
amendments to the Lacey Act were included in the section on “Prevention of Illegal
Logging Practices.” Id.
45. KRISTINA ALEXANDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42067, THE LACEY ACT:
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT BY RESTRICTING TRADE 2 (2014).
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strengthened plant protections in two main ways. First, they
broadened the definition of plants to include products made
from plants and “trees from either natural or planted forest
stands.”46 Previously, the Lacey Act protected only those plants
(not including trees) indigenous to the U.S. and listed in the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the ESA, or a state
endangered species law.47 “Common cultivars” and “common
food crops” are still excluded, though the amendment expressly
excludes trees from common cultivars.48 The U.S. Department
of Agriculture later defined these two terms in regulation: A
“common cultivar” is a plant (not including trees) that has
been artificially developed, and a “common food crop” is a plant
grown for human or animal consumption. 49 Both common
cultivars and common food crops must also be produced on a
commercial scale and not be listed in CITES, the ESA, or a
state endangered species list to be excluded from the Lacey
Act.50
The provision in the Lacey Act extending enforcement to
state laws existed before the 2008 expansions, but few cases
invoked the provision for plants. In 1992, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a Lacey Act conviction of a man who sold a saguaro
cactus in violation of the Arizona Native Plant Law. 51 In 1995,
the Northern District of Ohio dismissed twenty-nine Lacey Act
charges against two defendants for violating a state ginseng
permit law, on the grounds that ginseng is “more like a food
than a medicine,” and is thereby excluded from the Lacey
Act.52 After the 2008 amendments, the Fourth Circuit
subsequently upheld (on other grounds) a one-year prison
sentence and $50,000 fine under the Lacey Act for a
defendant’s guilty plea to transporting ginseng in violation of
46. Lacey Act, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 8204(a)(1), 122 Stat. 2052, 2052–53 (2008)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 3371(f)(1) (2012)).
47. Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371(f) (1982).
48. Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371(f)(2)(A) (2012). Also excluded are scientific
specimens and transplants. Id. § 3371(f)(2)(B), (C).
49. 7 C.F.R. § 357.2 (2017).
50. Id.
51. United States v. Miller, 981 F.2d 439, 441–42 (9th Cir. 1992).
52. United States v. McCullough, 891 F. Supp. 422, 426–27 (N.D. Ohio 1995). Note
that this case was decided before these terms were defined.
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North Carolina law, but did not discuss whether ginseng is
excluded or not.53 Because there have been so few cases using
the Lacey Act in conjunction with state law, the question of
whether wild ginseng falls within the Lacey Act’s current
protections is still unclear.
The second way the 2008 amendments strengthened plant
protections was by adding violations of foreign plant laws.54
Previously, only violations of animal-related foreign laws fell
under the Lacey Act. 55 Included in these foreign law provisions
is a requirement that plant importers declare a list of scientific
names, descriptions, and quantities of imported plants, as well
as the plants’ country of origin.56 These foreign-law
requirements have subsequently been used to some acclaim—
and notoriety—against large-scale importers of poached
lumber. For example, the USFWS raided Gibson Guitars in
2011 for importing rare ebony and rosewood in violation of
Indian and Malagasy laws. 57 The company ultimately settled,
and criminal charges were dropped in exchange for over
$600,000 in civil penalties and forfeitures.58
The relative successes of these foreign-law Lacey Act cases
could be examples for a revitalization of using the state-law
provisions to target the more egregious upstream buyers and
resellers of poached plants. One case out of Washington State,
discussed in Part III below, serves as a model of using the
Lacey Act in exactly this way. The power of the Lacey Act to
amplify state laws should be used carefully, however. Poachers
take plants for a variety of reasons, and those who poach out of
financial necessity often bear unequal burdens of penalties. In
any potential case, prosecutors must start with a foundational
understanding of the role of poverty on poaching.
53. United States v. Ledford, 389 Fed. App’x. 259, 259–60 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding
that defendant validly waived his right to appeal his sentence, and not reaching his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
54. ALEXANDER, supra note 45, at 4–6.
55. Lacey Act, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 8204(b)(1), 122 Stat. at 2053–54 (2008)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (2012)). For greater discussion on the
implications of applying the Lacey Act to foreign timber laws, see Krost, supra note 40,
at 70–77.
56. Id. § 8204(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 2054 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 3372(f)
(2012)).
57. ALEXANDER, supra note 45, at 14–18.
58. Id. at 18.
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III. POVERTY POACHING REQUIRES MORE EQUITABLE
SOLUTIONS
Poaching laws and traditional enforcement mechanisms
have historically neglected plants, leaving species that are
highly prized by collectors as vulnerable prey. Meanwhile,
sellers can reap massive profits59 from taking advantage of a
system where their commodity is nearly untraceable, and what
mild criminal risk exists falls almost exclusively on the
individual poacher. This system not only fails plants but also
perpetuates inequities against the people involved. In order to
find more practical solutions, we must first understand what
motivates poachers to take plants, and how traditional
enforcement is insufficient.
A. Understanding Poverty Poaching
A certain American mystique swirls behind the pioneer
outlaw, the rugged mountain family living by their wits, grit,
and familiarity with untamed forests, swamps, or deserts. The
idea of a self-sustaining individualist has a folk-hero appeal, a
Robin Hood ideal of surviving by fish, deer, fruit, or clam taken
from an oppressive noble’s elitist claim of ownership.60 Though
the government, environment, technology, and society have
drastically changed, the romanticized ideal persists and
spreads through family lines, cultures, and even modern
entertainment, as exemplified in reality television shows like
Rugged Justice61 and Appalachian Outlaws.62 This folk-crime
romanticism of poaching is one of many motives that scholars
attribute to poachers.

59. For example, a single flytrap purchased from a poacher for $0.25 has a resale
value of about $10. Shockman, supra note 7.
60. See, e.g., Erica von Essen et al., Deconstructing the Poaching Phenomenon: A
Review of Typologies for Understanding Illegal Hunting, 54 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 632,
641–42 (2014) (summarizing the resistance aspect of eighteenth-century English
poaching).
61. Rugged
Justice,
ANIMAL
PLANET,
https://www.animalplanet.com/tvshows/rugged-justice/ [https://perma.cc/C4BG-YGEG] (last visited Feb. 8, 2018)
(following wildlife enforcement agents in various states).
62. Appalachian Outlaws, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/shows/appalachianoutlaws [https://perma.cc/7KV7-TTPC] (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) (following ginseng
diggers, or “sangers,” and their buyers).
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Poaching enterprises arise from a variety of motives and
employ a range of coordination and sophistication. At the apex
of danger is the organized crime poacher—the large conspiracy
of natural resource trafficking that often is a stepping-stone or
a parallel to arms, drug, and human trafficking. 63 These
enterprises may be global in scope, and a great deal of legal
and public attention has put spotlights on the poaching of big
game such as elephants, tigers, and rhinos.64 Localized
criminal rings may garner less fevered attention, but
nevertheless devastate communities. For example, the lobster
mafia in the Northeast U.S. and Southeast Canada operates as
a “business enterprise” of commercial fishers overlapping legal
and illegal lobstering on such a large scale that other fishers
cannot or will not interfere, putting most of the burden of
preventing overfishing on state entities.65 Such large-scale
criminal enterprises are beyond the scope of this paper; rather,
this paper focuses on poverty-driven motives for poaching on
an individual scale.
Researchers have created a panoply of terms to describe the
often overlapping complexity of poaching motives: “ignorance,”
“recreational satisfaction[],” “trophy poaching,”66 “sociopolitical
resistance,”67 “tradition,” the “exhilaration” of doing something
illegal68––even psychopathic “thrill killing.”69 One of the less
63. Ruth A. Braun, Lions, Tigers and Bears (Oh My): How to Stop Endangered
Species Crime, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 545, 563 (2000) (“Many organized crime rings
that trade in wildlife also trade in drugs and weapons. They use the same methods of
transport and the same trafficking routes to conduct both illegal businesses.”).
64. See id. at 559–60, 569–70 (assessing the effectiveness of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in
combatting African elephant poaching and Asian tiger poaching); Ellen McDonald, Too
Big to Fail: Rescuing the African Elephant, 40 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 113 (2016);
Kofi Ernest Abotsi et al., Wildlife Crime and Degradation in Africa: An Analysis of the
Current Crisis and Prospects for a Secure Future, 27 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 394
(2016) (describing the history and outlook of elephant, rhinoceros, lion, and other biggame poaching in Sub-Saharan Africa).
65. John L. McMullan & David C. Perrier, Lobster Poaching and the Ironies of Law
Enforcement, 36 L. & SOC’Y REV. 679, 688–89 (2002).
66. Stephen L. Eliason, Accounts of Wildlife Law Violators: Motivations and
Rationalizations, 9 HUM. DIMENSIONS WILDLIFE 119, 122–25 (2004).
67. von Essen et al., supra note 60, at 641.
68. Craig J. Forsyth et al., The Game of Poaching: Folk Crimes in Southwest
Louisiana, 11 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 25, 30 (1998).
69. Robert M. Muth & John F. Bowe Jr., Illegal Harvest of Renewable Natural
Resources in North America: Toward a Typology of the Motivations for Poaching, 11
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inflammatory and more common motives for poaching is for
subsistence food or money, usually out of economic
desperation.70 For this category of motives, scholars have
varied in their approaches—some distinguish between those
who eat the poached animal or plant and those who sell it,71
while others distinguish between those who sell poached
products to buy necessities and those who sell in conjunction
with other minor crimes, often purchasing drugs.72 In reality,
as with most aspects of human behavior, an individual’s
personal motives are rarely so singularly clear-cut. Poaching
motives often overlap—an individual may poach out of both
financial necessity and out of an idealized folk-hero attitude,
for example.73 Because isolating motives to such a fine degree
is unrealistic, this comment defines “poverty poaching” to
include all types of individual-scale poaching (thereby
excluding organized crime) primarily motivated by financial
necessity, whether combined with other motives or not.
Poverty has long been intuitively linked with poaching,
though more empirical evidence is needed to flesh out the gaps
in our piecemeal understanding. 74 Many studies focus on
wildlife, particularly big-game species like elephants, 75 that
have gained worldwide support from animal lovers.
Understanding the motivations and real economic drivers

SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 9, 9 (1998).
70. von Essen et al., supra note 60, at 640 (“Livelihood crimes are seen as motivated
by economic factors and are often attributed as the most prevalent acts of illegal
hunting.”).
71. E.g., Forsyth et al., supra note 68, at 30–31.
72. E.g., Michael R. Pendleton, Taking the Forest: The Shared Meaning of Tree Theft,
11 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 39, 47–48 (1998) [hereinafter Pendleton, Tree Theft].
73. von Essen et al., supra note 60, at 642 (“Boundaries between livelihood crimes,
folk crimes and social crimes are rarely discrete.”).
74. Rosaleen Duffy & Freya A. V. St. John, Poverty, Poaching and Trafficking: What
Are
the
Links?,
EVIDENCE
ON
DEMAND
3–4
(2013),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a18ed915d622c000567/EoD_HD05
9_Jun2013_Poverty_Poaching.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D2K-QKRS] (making key findings
that “[w]e need a much better understanding of the relationships between poverty and
individual poacher motivation” and “[t]he evidence base for claims around poverty as a
driver of ivory and rhino poaching is thin, but that does not mean that poverty is not
an important factor”).
75. See, e.g., Andrew M. Lemieux & Ronald V. Clarke, The International Ban on
Ivory Sales and Its Effects on Elephant Poaching in Africa, 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
451 (2009).
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behind poaching would enable effective political and legal
strategies for combatting the poaching itself, as well as the
underlying poverty.
For example, the CITES 1989 ban on the international trade
of ivory may have helped reduce elephant poaching in some
African countries, depending on their domestic ivory
markets.76 However, some experts argue that the resulting
increase in black market prices did nothing to demotivate
poachers.77 Parallel to those successes, some African
communities have actually gained multi-level, cooperative
economic growth from the illegal ivory trade driven by high
demand from wealthier areas. 78 Contrastingly, ivory poaching
in other areas has been driven primarily by poverty—
especially areas caught in violent conflicts—and the rise of
organized ivory trafficking in turn creates even more local
poverty.79 Many terror groups, such as Al-Shabaab, finance
their operations through illegal plant and animal trade,
exploiting local populations to poach for them through
recruitment, threats, and bribes. 80
But poverty poaching does not always, or perhaps not even
usually, involve such global stakes. A majority of surveyed
Cajun poachers in Louisiana said they take wild game at times
when they could not afford food: “When you’re hungry, you got
to have some food, so [you] outlaw and that’s the truth.”81 Tree
poaching increased in the Pacific Northwest after forests were
closed to protect the northern spotted owl; one researcher
attributed the trend to out-of-work loggers desperate to “meet
the basic requirements of life,” those with jobs but looking for
“a quick route to a new pickup truck,” or those with criminal
backgrounds looking for a “convenient way” to earn money,
often in connection with drug use.82
Thus, while the many distinct motives underlying poaching
overlap like a messy quilt of culture and politics, economic

76. Id. at 453, 456, 459.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 456.
Duffy & St. John, supra note 74, at 3.
Id. at 5–6.
McDonald, supra note 64, at 115–16.
Forsyth et al., supra note 68, at 30.
Pendleton, Tree Theft, supra note 72, at 47–48.
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concerns exert overwhelming pressure on individuals. The role
of poverty on the first step of the criminal chain—the
individual poacher—must not be minimized. Enforcement
strategies for plant poaching will only be effective if they
incorporate these financial concerns into the underlying legal
framework.
B. Traditional Enforcement Against Plant Poaching Fails
Both Plants and People
“Traditional enforcement methods” means those typically
employed in animal poaching, i.e., punitive actions varying
from minor citations to property seizure or, rarely, arrest
against individuals caught in the act of poaching.83 The first
and perhaps most obvious reason that traditional enforcement
methods fail plants is that they already have limited success in
fish and wildlife poaching. Agents must catch poachers in the
act or shortly after, such as in the stereotypical cases of a
poacher hiding an untagged deer in a truck bed or slipping
undersized fish into a hidden boat compartment. Even when
tracking large animals like deer or bear, only a few resourcestrapped enforcement officers are available to patrol vast
regions: An Oregon State Police Fish and Wildlife Captain
estimated that his enforcement agents only “detect about [ten]
percent of poaching.”84 A waterfowl poacher in Kentucky
bragged to researchers: “I figure I’ve been caught once now out
of 1,000 times.”85 Officers may have to rely on decoys86 or
informants87 to get meaningful results.
These same issues crop up in plant poaching enforcement
83. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 77.15.060 (2017) (classifying the range of fish and
wildlife crimes from infractions to felonies); Steve Stuebner, States Get Semi-Tough on
Poachers, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Apr. 28, 1997), http://www.hcn.org/issues/108/3404
[https://perma.cc/QB9Z-5H3Y] (comparing variances in poaching enforcement
penalties in Western states).
84. Tony Schick, Many Poachers Uncaught, Lightly Punished in Northwest, KCTS9
(May
18,
2015),
https://kcts9.org/programs/wildlife-detectives/many-poachersuncaught-lightly-punished-in-northwest [https://perma.cc/QHT4-N3QX].
85. Eliason, supra note 66, at 125.
86. Stuebner, supra note 83Error! Bookmark not defined. (describing the
practice of using deer decoys).
87. Schick, supra note 84 (narrating a thwarted sting operation in which Oregon
officers relied on a dealer’s cooperation to prove some sold mule deer antlers were
poached).
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and are compounded by the ease with which poachers can
sneak hundreds or thousands of small plants away in small
backpacks.88 One North Carolina Wildlife Resources
Committee lieutenant literally stumbled over two camouflaged
women lying on their bellies in the swamp; they had already
dug up nearly 300 Venus flytraps. 89
The second reason why traditional methods are ineffective is
that poaching is often legally under-prioritized. A spate of
stricter wildlife poaching penalties popped up in several
western states in the late 1990s, 90 but even in states like
Washington and Oregon that impose relatively high fines and
allow seizure of vehicles and gear, poaching can still eclipse
enforcement efforts.91 Fines are often too small in relation to
potential profits: for just a few examples, mussel poachers can
make about $250,000 a year from cultured pearls,92 a single
bear gall bladder can sell for as much as $10,000, 93 and a
poacher could make $5,000–$10,000 by selling a single cedar to
a mill.94 As described above, the legal system often minimizes
plant poaching even more than wildlife, despite its enormous
costs.95

88. Khan, supra note 38Error! Bookmark not defined. (detailing cases in which a
group of three men in North Carolina were caught with a backpack full of 500 poached
purple pitcher plants); United States v. Hurley, No. 1:15-cr-00082-MR, 2015 BL
377137, at *3 (W.D.N.C Nov. 16, 2015) (Hurley was caught with 515 ginseng roots
hidden in a backpack).
89. Khan, supra note 38Error! Bookmark not defined..
90. Stuebner, supra note 83Error! Bookmark not defined..
91. Schick, supra note 84Error! Bookmark not defined. (citing that “deer
poaching happens at a higher rate in central Oregon than legal harvest” despite a
possible $7,500 fine); see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 77.15.094 (2017) (allowing fish and
wildlife officers to search and seize property as evidence).
92. Eliason, supra note 66, at 126. By contrast, one example of a state fine for
illegally harvested mussels is between $400–$950 for a first offense. LA. STAT. ANN. §§
56:450, 56:34 (2018).
93. Schick, supra note 84Error! Bookmark not defined.. At the time of Schick’s
article in 2015, bears were not even covered in Oregon’s wildlife penalties. Id. The law
has since been amended so that unlawful taking or killing of black bears may lead to a
$7,500 civil penalty. OR. REV. STAT. § 496.705(2)(a)(D) (2017).
94. Pendleton, Tree Theft, supra note 72, at 46. In Washington, unlawfully
possessing cedar or other “specialty wood” has a maximum penalty of $1,000. WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 76.48.021(23); 76.48.151 (2017).
95. See generally George Cameron Coggins & Anne Fleishel Harris, The Greening of
American Law?: The Recent Evolution of Federal Law for Preserving Floral Diversity,
27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 247, 248–50 (1987) (outlining the magnitude of potential plant
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Perhaps the most important aspect of poverty poaching is
that it is almost never exclusively about the poverty. A person
arrives at a state of poverty through a confluence of social
circumstances that should not be analyzed in total isolation. 96
For example, although many known tree poachers in the
Pacific Northwest are motivated by poverty and drug use, they
may also be influenced by the larger context of logging
communities still suffering from forest closures in the early
1990s partly due to the northern spotted owl’s listing as an
endangered species.97 Violent protests followed the closures,
including drive-by shootings of park ranger stations, an “arson
committee,” and mass forest cutting as civil disobedience.98
Communities develop their own moral codes around using
local natural resources that foster deep distrust of outsiders.99
Merely imposing fines or arrest to deter economic incentives
for poaching would not alleviate these other tensions. While
some officers thereby prefer the “soft enforcement” or “social
relations approach,” there is danger in dismissing violence as
merely “folk” crime just because it occurs in rural locations.100
The law must take poaching seriously, for plants as well as
wildlife, but not in isolation. A multi-tiered approach of stricter
penalties and systems that can target dealers over individual
poachers may help shift results to actually protecting more
plants and putting pressure on market-drivers, rather than
increasing the cycle of poverty.

species loss and the harm caused by loss of plant biodiversity); see also Forsyth et al.,
supra note 68, at 33 (listing reasons game wardens have given for selectively not
enforcing poaching in general).
96. von Essen et al., supra note 60, at 633 (arguing that the “reductionist sketch” of
rationalizing “illegal hunting” on the “level of the individual offender” “can pose a
problem when creating countermeasures”).
97. Michael R. Pendleton, Crime, Criminals and Guns in “Natural Settings”:
Exploring the Basis for Disarming Federal Rangers, 15 AM. J. POLICE 3, 13 (1996)
[hereinafter Pendleton, Guns].
98. Id.
99. McMullan & Perrier, supra note 65, at 684; Forsyth et al., supra note 68, at 26
(describing how forest burning was morally acceptable or not depending on the local
culture).
100. Pendleton, Guns, supra note 97, at 19, 22.
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IV. TWO ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL PLANT
POACHING ENFORCEMENT: HARSHER
PENALTIES AND THE LACEY ACT
North Carolina law serves as an example of one alternative
to small fines: stronger disincentives through harsher
penalties. In one case, prosecutors have attempted to protect
wild ginseng from the devastation a single, serial poacher can
wreak by successfully requesting prison sentences.
Additionally, in an effort to protect its iconic Venus flytrap,
North Carolina passed a felony flytrap poaching penalty in
2014. A second alternative to small fines is using the Lacey
Act’s application to state plant laws that has lain relatively
dormant. A recent Washington State case made use of this
provision against a large-scale buyer of domestic poached
lumber.101 This case may set a blueprint for disincentivizing
intentional buyers of poached plants.
A. North Carolina’s Stricter Plant Poaching Penalties
1. In the Case of Ginseng
“Sanging,” the Appalachian folk tradition of gathering wild
ginseng, presents a similar poaching situation to the Venus
flytrap. Poverty poaching plays a distinct role: Increased outof-season poaching may be linked with drug epidemics,102 and
“the law hits some poor families harder.”103
The motives for poaching ginseng are also heavily influenced
by folk custom.104 Two recent reality TV shows have glorified
101. J & L Tonewoods Indictment, supra note 10, at 7–8Error! Bookmark not
defined..
102. Kris Maher, Demand for Ginseng Boosts Prices, Tempts Poachers; Medicinal
Herb Grows Wildly in Appalachia and the Midwest, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2014),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/demand-for-ginseng-boosts-prices-tempts-poachers1410971637.
103. See David Taylor, The Fight Against Ginseng Poaching in the Great Smoky
Mountains, SMITHSONIAN (April 21, 2016), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/sciencenature/fight-against-ginseng-poaching-great-smoky-mountains180958858/#5yt3dgupFdl5o7zV.99 [https://perma.cc/CP58-HW6Q] [hereinafter Taylor,
Great Smoky Mountains].
104. Some experts link ginseng trade to George Washington and John Jacob Astor.
Maher, supra note 102Error! Bookmark not defined.. Even before then, the
Iroquois used ginseng for centuries and helped the French start ginseng trade with
China around 1715. Taylor, Great Smoky Mountains, supra note 103Error!
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and exaggerated ginseng poaching.105 Like the flytrap and
figured maple, ginseng has a highly profitable market,
particularly due to alternative medicine marketers who prize
wild ginseng over cultivated ginseng.106 According to
prosecutor David Thorneloe, who handles many federal
ginseng poaching cases, an experienced poacher can make
hundreds of dollars in a day, or thousands on an extended
trip.107 Enforcement agents in areas where harvesting is
restricted, like in North Carolina’s Great Smoky Mountains
National Park, struggle continuously against illegal “sangers”
from communities who have harvested ginseng for
generations.108
One sanger in particular, Billy Joe Hurley, has become so
notorious in the Great Smoky Mountains that he received a
rare six-month prison sentence in 2015 for taking 500 ginseng
roots—the maximum sentence for the misdemeanor of
“[p]ossessing, destroying, injuring, defacing, removing, digging,
or disturbing” ginseng under National Park Service regulation
36 C.F.R. § 2.1.109 Hurley has been convicted five times for the
same misdemeanor, and according to biologists in the Great
Smoky Mountains, does “tremendous damage” by gathering
entire swaths of ginseng in one watershed instead of isolated
patches.110
Bookmark not defined..
105. Taylor, Great Smoky Mountains, supra note 102103Error! Bookmark not
defined..
106. Maher, supra note 102Error! Bookmark not defined.; David Taylor, Rare
New Hampshire Plant More Precious than Ever, NPR, http://info.nhpr.org/node/13932
[https://perma.cc/6ARE-ZM6N] (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). Some ginseng farmers grow
“wild-simulated” ginseng, which can still sell at $300–$700 per pound. Brian Barth, 5
of the Most Valuable Crops You Can Grow in the US—And How to Grow Them,
MODERN FARMER (July 17, 2017), https://modernfarmer.com/2017/07/5-valuable-cropscan-grow-us-grow/ [https://perma.cc/7UD4-LFXW].
107. Telephone Interview with David Thorneloe, U.S. Attorney (Feb. 2, 2017)
[hereinafter Thorneloe 1]. In the reality show Appalachian Outlaws, ginseng buyer
Tony Coffman brags that his business is worth “not just tens of millions of dollars, but
hundreds of millions of dollars.” Appalachian Outlaws: Dirty Money, at 09:44 (History
television broadcast Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.history.com/shows/appalachianoutlaws/season-1/episode-1 [https://perma.cc/DJX7-JSTJ].
108. Telephone Interview with David Thorneloe, U.S. Attorney (Feb. 21, 2017)
[hereinafter Thorneloe 2].
109. United States v. Hurley, No. 1:15-cr-00082-MR, 2015 BL 377137, at *7
(W.D.N.C Nov. 16, 2015).
110. Taylor, Great Smoky Mountains, supra note 103Error! Bookmark not defined..
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Thorneloe, who prosecuted the latest case and several of
Hurley’s earlier convictions, said that while ginseng poaching
cases in general are common, and Hurley “was turning into an
annual event,” such repeat offenses are relatively rare.111
Thorneloe stated that although he has considered using the
Lacey Act to take advantage of its higher potential penalty as
a felony, the National Park Service’s regulation has been
sufficient in these cases.112
2. In the Case of the Venus Flytrap
North Carolina has taken a decisive stance on tougher
penalties in a recent attempt to curb poaching of the Venus
flytrap, its official state carnivorous plant. 113 In 2014, the State
created a new felony penalty for “[a]ny person, firm, or
corporation who digs up, pulls up, takes, or carries away. . .any
Venus flytrap [plant or seed]. . .growing upon the lands of
another person, or from the public domain, with the intent to
steal.”114 Instead of the previous misdemeanor maximum $50
fine,115 the new felony is punishable by at least four and up to
thirty months in prison.116 The only exception is for someone
who has a permit, which must be in the person’s possession at
the time they dig, pull, take, or carry away the plant. 117
The first charges under the new felony law were levied
against four men who poached 970 flytraps from the Holly
Shelter Game Land in January 2015. 118 Three of the men pled
guilty and received sentences of twelve and twenty-four
111. Thorneloe 1, supra note 107Error! Bookmark not defined..
112. Thorneloe 2, supra note 108Error! Bookmark not defined..
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 145-22 (2016).
114. Id. § 14-129.3(a).
115. During the same session, the General Assembly expanded this penalty up to
$175 for the taking of many other state-protected plants. S.B. 734, 2013-14 Sess. (N.C.
2013), 2014-120 N.C. Sess. Laws 36 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-129 (2017)).
116. N.C. SENTENCING & POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING
TRAINING AND REFERENCE MANUAL 4–5 (2009).
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-129.3(b) (2017).
118. Christopher Mele, Venus Flytraps Need Protection From Poachers in North
Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/us/venusflytraps-poaching-north-carolina.html?_r=0\; see also, That Won’t Fly: Venus Flytrap
Thief Snags Prison Sentence in North Carolina, GUARDIAN (July 27, 2016)
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/27/venus-flytrap-thief-prison-sentencenorth-carolina [https://perma.cc/V8C3-J4HH].

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2018

21

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5

2018]

TRAPPED IN THE GODDESS’S MOUSETRAP

383

months of probation; the fourth received six to seventeen
months in prison.119 Not long after, in November of 2015, two
other men—both with prior plant poaching criminal records—
were also charged under the new felony for poaching 1025
Venus flytraps (along with some pitcher plants) from private
property on Orton Plantation. 120 By sentencing some of the
most egregious ginseng and flytrap poachers to jail time, North
Carolina has shown it takes these crimes seriously, and is
attempting to deter other potential poachers.
B. Using the Lacey Act to Enforce State Laws: United
States v. J & L Tonewoods
On the other side of the country from North Carolina’s bogs,
a similar poaching epidemic has chopped its way through the
Pacific Northwest’s temperate rainforests. Scattered among
the tall bigleaf maples are a few “defective” trees with ripples
like petrified waves through their woodgrain—ripples prized
by guitar-makers and poetically termed “figured maple” or
“music wood.”121 These trees—among others prized by
poachers, like cedar and Douglas fir—can easily exceed 100
feet in height, and have long fallen prey to resourceful
midnight chainsaw operators. 122 Such “tree theft” has been
documented since the early 20th century,123 with monetary
losses estimated from $100 million 124 to $1 billion across the
U.S. annually.125 The ties between tree poaching, poverty, and
119. Mele, supra note 118; Jim Ware, Brunswick Man Found Guilty in Venus’
Flytrap
Theft,
STARNEWS
(July
26,
2016),
http://www.starnewsonline.com/news/20160726/brunswick-man-found-guilty-in-venusflytrap-theft [https://perma.cc/9NVH-LWDC].
120. Josh Shaffer, Big Penalty Awaits North Carolina’s Flytrap Pilferers,
CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER
(Nov.
30,
2015),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article47144230.html
[https://perma.cc/Y82T-SQ64].
121. Ellis E. Conklin, The Olympic Peninsula’s Meth-Head Maple Thieves, SEATTLE
WEEKLY (Apr. 16, 2013), http://archive.seattleweekly.com/home/946487-129/woodmaple-says-timber-sisson-county [https://perma.cc/E6C3-J253].
122. Id. (quoting an interview by Mason County Sheriff’s Deputy Jason Sisson:
“[T]hey’re out there with goggles and headlamps and chainsaws, felling 200-foot trees
in the middle of the night!”).
123. Pendleton, Tree Theft, supra note 72, at 39.
124. Id.
125. Conklin, supra note 121.
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drug use—particularly methamphetamine (meth)—are just as
well-documented.126 A local of the logging community of
Shelton, Washington told reporters that people who steal
maple:
[W]ork like dogs. . .and then they smoke it up and do it
all again. . ..I asked one of them why he can’t find any
easier way to steal. And he just says to me, he says, ‘It’s
real easy to do this [expletive] and not get caught.’127
Despite the extensive ecological and monetary damage these
tree poachers cause, they are rarely caught or prosecuted.128 As
with ginseng, community silence and acceptance may again
play a strong role in this trend, including acceptance of mill
owners who knowingly buy poached wood.129 These mill
practices were largely unquestioned and unchallenged, until
an innovative combination of a Washington State permitting
law and the Lacey Act was used to target not only the
individual poverty poachers but also the knowing buyer.
In July of 2015, a federal grand jury indicted Washington
timber mill J & L Tonewoods for knowingly buying figured
maple poached from the Gifford Pinchot National Forest and
reselling it to guitar makers, earning over $800,000 between
2011 and 2013 alone. 130 The prosecutor in this case, Seth
Wilkinson, had prosecuted individual “cutters” before, but felt
those convictions did little to relieve the poaching problem.131
Meth use, he said, is “mutually complimentary with this type
of theft’’ because cutters use meth to “keep going” and work
long hours in the night.132 Similar to the theft of copper wire in
126. See, e.g., Pendleton, Tree Theft, supra note 72, at 47–48 (categorizing the
“desperate poacher” as someone “having difficulty making enough income to meet the
basic requirements of life” and the “criminal poacher” as commonly “associated with
drug use and drug dealing”).
127. Conklin, supra note 121Error! Bookmark not defined..
128. Id.
129. Pendleton, Tree Theft, supra note 72, at 39, 44.
130. J & L Tonewoods Indictment, supra note 10 at 4. Three individual poachers
were also indicted in this case for theft and damage to government property. Id. at 5–
6.
131. Telephone Interview of Seth Wilkinson, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Dec. 8, 2016)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Wilkinson 1].
132. Id.
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urban areas, he says that figured maple is a “classic example”
of an item in rural areas that is “easy to take” and has
“tremendous value.”133
Coordinated law enforcement found a larger target: J & L
Tonewoods, a mill that may have been relying partly on the
community’s silence to perpetuate the problem. According to
Wilkinson, such mills have well-known reputations,134 but “the
biggest challenge” is proving that the mill is buying wood it
knows is stolen.135 This is where a Washington state
permitting law helped fill in that gap.
The Washington Specialized Forest Products Act (SFPA)
requires a state permit 136 for harvesting any “specialized forest
product” listed in the SFPA, which includes bigleaf maple.137
Buyers of specialized forest products must also ensure that
suppliers have a valid permit, 138 and record and retain that
permit number.139 In United States v. J & L Tonewoods,
investigators showed—through the mill owner’s failure to
check for record permit numbers—that he knew that he was
purchasing and reselling figured maple taken in violation of
state law.140 These state laws not only provided the required
mens rea,141 but also provided the hook to apply the Lacey Act
and its harsher penalties. Since the J & L Tonewoods
indictment, Washington federal prosecutors have not brought
any subsequent cases against lumber mills. 142 Though the J &
L Tonewoods case was too recent to evaluate its deterrent
effect, Wilkinson hopes that the lack of subsequent cases is
133. Id.
134. Id. (“You pretty much always know where the wood is going.”).
135. Id. “Knowingly” is the required mens rea for all related charges against J & L
Tonewoods, including receipt of stolen federal property and violations of the Lacey Act.
J & L Tonewoods Indictment, supra note 10, at 4, 7–8.
136. WASH. REV. CODE. § 76.48.131 (2017).
137. Id. § 76.48.021(21), (23).
138. Id. § 76.48.101.
139. Id. § 76.48.111.
140. J & L Tonewoods Indictment, supra note 10, at 7–8.
141. The other charge indicted against Tonewoods, receipt of stolen federal property
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 641, requires the government to prove that the defendant knew
the property was stolen, rather than that the defendant just bought the trees without
checking for a permit. Interview with Seth Wilkinson, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Feb.
17, 2017) [hereinafter Wilkinson 2].
142. Id.
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because other mills have taken notice, and are being more
careful in their lumber purchases.143
V. A MULTI-LAYERED APPROACH TO EQUITABLY
CURBING VENUS FLYTRAP POACHING
Plants like the Venus flytrap that are targets of poachers
have economic, cultural, and ecological value deserving
protection. Yet, federal law has not provided these plants with
the same protections as animals, and poaching has taken a
heavy toll on both the targeted species and the local
communities that are being stripped of their natural wonders.
Those investigators and prosecutors who do take plant
poaching seriously have few options but to rely on traditional
animal poaching enforcement methods, which are not designed
to protect plants. Furthermore, these traditional methods
perpetuate inequities against poverty poachers.
Instead, a workable enforcement scheme must broaden its
scope to encompass the needs of plants, reduce tensions
between the government and communities that idealize folk
crimes, and aim the power of state and federal laws towards
dealers who most influence illegal trafficking. North Carolina
has already shown it values its unique carnivorous plant with
its felony poaching law, but that may not be enough in itself.
Protecting the Venus flytrap should involve a multi-layered
framework of stronger deterrence, a way to show a buyer’s
criminal intent through a marking or permit system, and using
the Lacey Act to target charges at buyers and resellers.
A. Layer One: Benefits and Drawbacks of Tougher
Penalties Alone
While the 2014 North Carolina felony penalty is too new to
determine its possible deterrent effect, the focus of the law is
still on individual poachers, who may or may not be poaching
out of economic necessity. On the one hand, removing serial
poachers with jail time may give targeted plants a chance to
recover or be relocated, as in the case of sanger Billy Joe
Hurley. Other smaller-scale poachers or potential poachers

143. Id.
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may also be discouraged from entering the trade altogether.
Because a single poacher can devastate an entire swath of
flytraps (or ginseng) within a few hours, removing even a few
of the more injurious individuals may have a large positive
impact on the ecosystem.144
On the other hand, the ever-increasing rarity and prices of
ginseng and Venus flytraps may offset any deterrent effect.
Throwing poverty poachers in jail will likely only increase
their cycle of poverty, and they may end up returning to
poaching—as with any black-market trade—out of necessity.
In other poaching contexts, stiffer penalties may start to
backfire: in the face of harsh punishment, poachers may turn
to violence when confronted.145 Especially when poverty is
mixed with other motives, such as cultural tradition or
defiance against the government, increasingly harsh
punishment may only further delegitimize the law in the eyes
of poachers and their communities.146 Additionally, removing
individual poachers reduces neither the market demand for
Venus flytraps, nor dealers’ willingness to accept suspicious
plants without question.
B. Layer Two: Tracking the Dealer’s Intent Through
Permits and Markings
Despite its flaws, the felony Venus flytrap law can still be a
useful tool. In combination with other state laws or
regulations, these penalties could theoretically be levied
against illegal buyers and resellers, but there are difficulties to
overcome. Mainly, dealers’ “intent to steal”147 would be difficult
to prove, as they could always claim ignorance of the flytrap’s
origin. One potential solution might be to require resellers to

144. See, e.g., Taylor, Great Smoky Mountains, supra note 103Error! Bookmark
not defined.; Mele, supra note 118Error! Bookmark not defined. (quoting Massey
as saying, “he could collect ‘a couple of hundred’ of the [flytraps] in three or four hours
crawling on the forest floor”).
145. von Essen et al., supra note 60, at 635 (noting that “harsh penal codes have
created a cycle of progressively more violent retaliations between illegal hunters and
the rest of society”).
146. Id. at 643–44 (“[A]n overly punitive sanction in a management context with
legitimacy deficit and weak social bonds between perpetrators and the sanctioning
agent would . . . result in further loss of respect for authorities.”).
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-129.3(a) (2017).
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maintain records of their sources’ valid permits, similar
perhaps to Washington’s specialized forest product permit.148
North Carolina already has permit requirements for Venus
flytrap diggers.149 In addition, buyers must get a copy of the
digger’s permit when buying out-of-season, but need not obtain
their own dealer’s permit to buy or resell flytraps.150 Ginseng
dealers, by contrast, must have their own permit to buy or
resell ginseng, which they must renew annually.151 The North
Carolina state legislature need only close some slight gaps to
shift the heavier permitting burden onto flytrap dealers, as
well as the responsibility to affirmatively show that they
source flytraps from legal diggers.
Another potential aid to proving a dealer’s criminal intent—
whether in conjunction with a permitting system or not—may
be a widespread marking system. Biologist Jeff Corbin
developed a fluorescent dye used to mark ginseng roots in the
Great Smoky Mountains, which has been successfully used to
show the origin of poached ginseng in Billy Joe Hurley’s case
and others.152 In J & L Tonewoods, prosecutors had prepared
(but did not use) DNA evidence linking the stolen wood to
stumps on federal land.153 Orange dye has also been used on
Venus flytraps in the National Conservancy’s Green Swamp
Preserve since 2006. 154 If a marking system were used to trace
where flytraps were taken, however, the system would have to
be consistently applied in all public lands where flytraps are
protected. Also, the State would need to incorporate such a
marking system not just against the poacher, but also against
a dealer, such as by requiring dealers to check for markings
and record the results in a verifiable way.

148. WASH. REV. CODE. § 76.48.131 (2017).
149. Id. § 106-202.19(a)(6a).
150. Id. § 106-202.19(a)(6c). Violations of these permitting requirements are Class 2
misdemeanors. Id. § 106-202.19(a)(1).
151. Id. §§ 106-202.19(a)(6); 106-202.21. An April 2017 attempt to strengthen
ginseng permitting died in committee. H.B. 733, 2017-2018 Sess. (N.C. 2017).
152. Taylor, Great Smoky Mountains, supra note 103Error! Bookmark not
defined..
153. Wilkinson 1, supra note 131.
154. Shaffer, supra note 120Error! Bookmark not defined..
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C. Layer Three: Overlaying the Lacey Act on State Laws
The Lacey Act broadly prohibits three general categories of
activities related to plants: 1) importing foreign plants without
the proper declaration;155 2) falsely labeling or identifying
plants intended for foreign or interstate commerce;156 and 3)
any other non-marking offenses.157 State laws are only
implicated in the latter two prohibitions. Relevant nonmarking offenses broadly include the selling, receiving,
acquiring, or purchasing of any plant taken or possessed in
violation of any state law or regulation “that protects
plants.”158
The Lacey Act may provide more flexibility in proving
intent, depending on the circumstances. Penalties fall under
three categories: civil,159 criminal,160 and forfeiture of imported
plants.161 Civil penalties for non-marking plant violations
require only a showing that the person did not exercise due
care to ensure that the plants were not taken, possessed,
transported, or sold unlawfully.162 If the plants are worth at
least $350, the civil penalty maxes out at $10,000 for each
violation.163 Felony criminal penalties may apply to someone
155. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(f) (2012).
156. Id. § 3372(d).
157. Id. § 3372(a). These non-marking violations are themselves split into many
types, most of which are not relevant to this discussion. Plants taken in violation of
U.S. federal or tribal law are covered in § 3372(a)(1), while § 3372(a)(2) covers
violations of state or foreign law. Plants that are harvested legally but sold or
transported without payment of a required state or foreign tax or fee, are also
protected under § 3372(a)(2)(B)(ii). See ALEXANDER, supra note 45, at 5–7
(summarizing and giving examples of how the various prohibitions in the Lacey Act
may be applied to different plant law violations).
158. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). More specifically, the state law involved
must regulate: “(I) the theft of plants; (II) the taking of plants from a park, forest
reserve, or other officially protected area; (III) the taking of plants from an officially
designated area; or (IV) the taking of plants without, or contrary to, required
authorization.” Id.
159. Id. § 3373(a).
160. Id. § 3373(d).
161. Id. § 3374(a). Not relevant here is an additional potential forfeiture of an import
permit. Id. § 3373(e); see also Krost, supra note 40, at 61–63 (summarizing the Lacey
Act’s penalty mechanisms).
162. 16 U.S.C. § 3373(a)(1) (2012). Additionally, showing the person knowingly
falsely labeled a plant for interstate commerce can garner the same civil penalty. Id.
163. Id.
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who violates a non-marking prohibition by “knowingly
engaging in conduct that involves the sale or purchase. . .or the
intent to sell or purchase” plants “knowing that the. . .plants
were taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of. .
.any underlying law.”164 So long as the value of plants is at
least $350, a felony criminal penalty can be as high as $20,000
and/or a maximum five years in prison. 165 However, a
misdemeanor fine of $10,000 and/or one year in prison may
also apply to a dealer who only “in the exercise of due care
should know” that plants were taken in violation of an
underlying law.166 In other words, a felony charge requires that
the buyer know the plants were poached, but a misdemeanor
charge more closely approaches negligently buying poached
plants.
Using the Lacey Act to prove the dealer’s criminal intent (as
well as to attain a higher penalty) could be another way to use
North Carolina’s felony Venus flytrap law against dealers. If a
flytrap digger takes flytraps without the required digging
permit—and had the intent to steal the flytrap—then the
digger has violated the state felony law.167 If a dealer then
buys flytraps from that digger out-of-season without getting a
copy of the digger’s (non-existent) permit, then that dealer has
committed a state misdemeanor.168 However, even without the
state misdemeanor, that dealer could also be charged with a
Lacey Act violation. By not exercising due care in checking for
the digger’s permit (or buying flytraps in other suspicious
circumstances), the dealer should know the flytraps are stolen
and could be charged with a misdemeanor Lacey Act violation.
If a plant marking system or stricter permitting system were
implemented to prove that a dealer actually knows they are
buying stolen flytraps, then the dealer could even be charged
with a felony Lacey Act violation. In this way, innocent store
buyers at least one link removed from this chain would not be
culpable; only those dealers who purchase flytraps directly
from poachers could be liable.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. § 3373(d)(1) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. § 3373(d)(2) (emphasis added).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-129.3 (2017).
Id. § 106-202.19(a)(6c), (a1).
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But: A word of caution. Because the Lacey Act can sweep so
broadly, prosecutors may want to reserve its use for more
egregious cases to avoid political and community backlash.
After the Gibson Guitar crackdown, instrument makers, legal
scholars, and politicians sputtered stinging venom against the
Lacey Act’s 2008 amendments expanding foreign law to plants.
Nearly 9,000 musical instrument merchants protested the
burden on importers to know and comply with all foreign plant
laws;169 scholars criticized the Act’s complexities and
enforcement issues;170 and a handful of members in Congress
attempted to amend it again. 171 The power of such a combined
state and federal system could go a long way towards
protecting the Venus flytrap, but should always be
implemented with a mind towards fairness.
VI. CONCLUSION
Poverty poaching has only received sporadic scholastic
attention, and more evidence must be collected in the field of
plant poaching. Still, existing patterns of poaching motivations
provide enough background for lawmakers to integrate the
effects of poverty into more effective plant poaching laws.
Stricter punishments alone, like North Carolina’s 2014 felony
penalty, will not decrease market demand for highly collectible
plants like Venus flytraps, and may only shift the heaviest
burdens onto individuals that already poach out of
desperation. However, aiming those harsher penalties at
upstream buyers and resellers who make the most profits—
through a combination of permits, plant markings, and the
Lacey Act—may better protect the Venus flytrap and other
vulnerable species. Without a workable, equitable framework,
this tiny, jawed plant that has so long captured the world’s
fascination—the Goddess Dione’s mousetrap—may become as
mythical as its namesake.

169. Wesley Ryan Shelley, Comment, Setting the Tone: The Lacey Act’s Attempt to
Combat the International Trade of Illegally Obtained Plant and Wildlife and its Effect
on Musical Instrument Manufacturing, 42 ENVTL. L. 549, 565 (2012).
170. Krost, supra note 40Error! Bookmark not defined., at 70–76.
171. Shelley, supra note 169169, at 573–74.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol8/iss2/5

30

